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THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF
19TH CENTURY COURTS
Nancy S. Marder
Amalia D. Kessler. Inventing American Exceptionalism: The Origins of American
Adversarial Legal Culture, 1800–1877. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017.
449 pp. Illustrations, appendix, notes, bibliography, and index. $35.00.
Amalia Kessler’s task in Inventing American Exceptionalism, which she performs
exceedingly well, is to challenge the idea that adversarialism was always a
feature of American courts. She does this by tracing the development of our
court system between 1800–1877 and showing that there were different models
of courts and procedures throughout this period. She describes the rise and
fall of courts that even many proceduralists are unlikely to have extensive
knowledge of, including equity courts, conciliation courts, and the Freedmen’s
Bureau courts. In uncovering this fascinating history, Kessler explains the role
that lawyers played in helping courts of law (also known as common-law
courts) gain in popularity, as well as lawyers’ contribution to the demise of
equity courts.
Not only does Kessler show that courts were more varied than students of
the American court system might expect, but also that lay participants played
a role in each of these types of courts. In our own day, professional judges
preside over courtroom proceedings; however, in the period that Kessler
examines, lay participants also performed judicial functions in equity courts,
conciliation courts, and Freedmen’s Bureau courts. Kessler’s study of these
various courts reveals that the demarcation between professional judge and
lay participant, which is so pronounced in our own time, was far less clear
in various types of courts in the nineteenth century.
Kessler begins her exploration with equity courts, which she describes as
“quasi-inquisitorial” rather than adversarial in nature (p. 5). These courts,
also known as chancery courts, were headed by a chancellor and marked
by proceedings that were reduced to writing and conducted in secret and
were adversarial only to the extent that the parties initiated them. Witnesses
answered questions, which were written down by an examiner and the testimony was not revealed until there was a decision. Witnesses were examined
only once (on the theory that otherwise they might be tempted to alter their
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testimony). The documentary evidence was submitted to the chancellor, who
was supposed to decide the case based on his “powerful moral intuition” or
“refined moral sensibility” and to “pursue the outcome that was procedurally
just” (p. 38, 53). The equity judge was viewed, at least according to two main
proponents of equity courts, Chancellor of New York Court of Chancery James
Kent and U.S. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, as “a kind of Romantic
hero” (p. 43). Initially, lawyers had little role to play in these courts, which
served primarily the elite, but lawyers transformed their role over time.
Kessler focuses on the way in which lawyers incrementally created a
role for themselves in chancery court, and in doing so, helped to transform
chancery court so that its proceedings became oral and adversarial rather
than written and quasi-inquisitorial. She uses the New York Chancery as her
focal point. Equity courts were under pressure from a growing population,
an increase in commercial activity, and greater democratization. Meanwhile,
chancery staff remained minimal: there were examiners, who were full-time
court officials and wrote down witnesses’ testimony; masters, who helped
resolve disputed facts; commissioners, who were lay people whose task was
to examine witnesses and who were hired on an ad hoc basis and were paid
by the parties to perform their task, and the chancellor, who decided the case
on the documentary evidence prepared by examiners, commissioners, and
masters and who could ensure specific relief. Instead of increasing the chancery staff to grapple with changes in society, chancery court began to embrace
the oral and adversarial procedures lawyers urged. As masters moved from
written interrogatories to oral testimony because it was quicker (a move that
was eventually upheld by Chancellor Kent), it opened the door to lawyers
performing this function. Over time, lawyers were able to assume responsibility for questioning witnesses orally and for shaping the questioning to the
benefit of their client. Procedural power shifted from masters and examiners
to lawyers, and with the involvement of lawyers, the masters’ and examiners’
roles receded into the background.
Kessler shows that equity courts fell out of favor well before the Field Code
of 1848, which constituted the formal merger of law and equity in New York.
In the 1820s and 1830s, equity courts were under attack by governors, legislators, constitutional convention delegates, and lawyers. In a time of growing
democratization, chancery court was seen as elitist and undemocratic. The
chancellor and his staff were seen as having excessive power and the chancellor was criticized for being a “one-man court” especially when compared to
common-law courts, which relied on juries (p. 117). The chancellor was also
seen as being remote because the New York Chancery Court was located in
Albany, New York. This meant that litigants had to pay for their lawyer to
travel to Albany or to hire additional counsel in Albany to supplement the
services that local counsel provided. In the late 1830s, the chancery court
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was seen as part of a spoils system in which loyal party members were given
positions. It was also seen as a court that could not keep up with its growing
docket. In 1846, the New York Constitution abolished chancery and provided
for a single court system that had jurisdiction in law and equity.
Kessler then focuses on the very interesting question of what motivated
lawyers to transform equity proceedings into an oral, lawyer-driven process
that typified the adversarialism in common-law courts. Her explanation is that
lawyers embraced civic republicanism in which they saw themselves as civic
leaders who worked for the public good. Oratory was an important tool for
moving the public toward civic virtue. Lawyers saw their oratory as helpful
in defining the national character. Cross-examination, in particular, was an
important component of this oratory. Kessler describes cross-examination as
“a mechanism of republican self-display” (p. 166). In courts of law, this display
took place before the jury, which “was embraced as a key component of the
lawyer’s audience” (p. 167). The courtroom in a court of law also included
members of the public and other lawyers, and they constituted part of the
lawyers’ audience as well. Kessler makes use of the personal diaries of New
York lawyer Henry Vanderlyn, who kept two sets of diaries between April
1827–March 1857, and who expressed concern in his diaries about his own
speech-making abilities. Kessler focuses on Vanderlyn and describes his selfconception as “a virtuous republican lawyer” and his efforts to maintain his
independence and to keep free from corrupting influences (p. 181). Yet, the
reader needs to maintain some skepticism about Vanderlyn, who portrays
himself and his achievements in the best possible light.
During the nineteenth century, other countries, such as France, Spain,
Denmark, and Prussia, turned to conciliation courts, and some states, such
as Florida and California, which had been under Spanish or Mexican rule,
retained a form of conciliation court, albeit briefly. However, these courts valued communal harmony above the rights of individuals and were eventually
rejected. Between 1815–1848, there were changes in the United States in mass
production, employment relations, consumer practices, and transportation.
Conciliation courts were a less expensive and less time-consuming way to
end a dispute and to restore the peace. A number of European countries had
adopted this model of court. In Spain, for example, an alcalde, or local judge,
served as a conciliator alongside two “’good men’” named by each party, and
this court suggested a resolution “‘appropriate for ending the litigation’” (p.
212). In France, the justice de paix, like the Spanish alcalde, was not supposed
to have legal training or to apply the law. Instead, the main requirement of
a justice de paix, like the alcalde, was his standing in the community. Florida,
which had once been under Spanish rule, had local alcaldes. In 1823, there
was a debate in Florida about proposed legislation that would implement
conciliation courts. Kessler followed this debate in letters to the editor and
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other newspaper pieces. The legislative council ultimately voted against the
enactment of conciliation courts. Opponents of the conciliation courts worried
that such courts were “contrary to the American spirit of liberty” (p. 221). California, which became a U.S. state in 1850, inherited conciliation courts when it
was part of Mexico and before that part of the Spanish Empire. However, the
California judiciary decided that such courts were incompatible with American
legal culture and declared them obsolete. One explanation is that conciliation
courts dispensed personal justice, but not the rule of law; another was that they
put too much power in the hands of alcaldes. New York delegates discussed
conciliation courts during the state’s constitutional convention in 1846. They
agreed on a constitutional provision to authorize the legislature to establish
conciliation courts, but did not provide for structure or function. Most state
legislatures failed to act on new constitutional provisions authorizing them
to create conciliation courts, perhaps because conciliation courts were viewed
as antithetical to American values.
However, the Freedmen’s Bureau did manage to establish a form of conciliation court in the South after the Civil War, though it was short-lived (lasting
only four years). The Freedmen’s Bureau, which was a quasi-judicial, quasiadministrative agency established by statute on March 3, 1865, was supposed
to provide justice to the former slaves. The idea was that the Freedmen’s
Bureau courts would teach the freed people about established law and help
them to become self-sufficient. The challenge was that these courts had to resolve disputes not only between freed people, but also between freed people
and whites. In interracial disputes, a conciliation court consisted of an agent
from the Freedmen’s Bureau, a person chosen by the freed man, and a person
chosen by the Southern white. All three were lay people (though the agent
could be a state magistrate) tasked to resolve the dispute, rather than to apply
the law. There also seemed to be great variation in whether the parties had
counsel, whether the proceedings were public, and how many lay judges were
used. Although the freed men viewed the courts favorably for the most part,
the Southern whites saw them as an unconstitutional extension of the federal
government’s authority and resisted them.
Kessler’s book uncovers courts with which even proceduralists might be
unfamiliar. They might know the names of some of these courts, such as chancery courts or Freedmen’s Bureau courts, but probably have little knowledge
about how they were constituted and the procedures they followed, much less
how they changed over time. Kessler provides a wealth of information about
these courts. Her research is meticulous and she draws from a vast array of
sources, including archives, cases, newspaper articles, treatises, letters, diaries,
and photos. Although the book is full of rich detail, she does not let it obscure
her underlying themes. She tells the fascinating story of the rise and fall of
equity courts and the role that lawyers carved out for themselves in these
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courts. She also describes lawyers’ embrace of courts of law because such courts
provided them with a venue that was well suited to their civic republicanism.
They were able to engage in cross-examination in a public setting before an
audience consisting of jurors, members of the public, and fellow attorneys.
Although Kessler seems to place a lot of weight on civic republicanism as an
explanation for how and why lawyers transformed their role, she develops
her argument with care and from a close reading of a variety of sources.
Kessler might not have set out to explore the use of lay participation in
these different courts, but in her delineation of these courts, she has provided
a wealth of information for jury scholars. She has pointed us to equity courts
to see how lay participants were used as commissioners and she has directed
us to conciliation courts in Florida and California to show us how lay people
served as lay judges. Alcaldes served in this capacity, not through any knowledge of the law, but as a result of their standing in the community. Because they
were well regarded in their community, they were able to resolve disputes and
restore harmony. Kessler also leads us to the Freedmen’s Bureau courts, which
were a form of conciliation court, consisting of laymen who were unfamiliar
with the law. One goal of these courts was to assist freed people, which they
seemed to do. Another goal was to resolve disputes between freed people and
white Southerners, which they did less successfully.
Throughout Kessler’s book, the jury stands as a symbol of American liberty
and justice, even as judges began to wrest some power away from juries during the nineteenth century. The lack of a jury in chancery court contributed
to its reputation as a court for the elite. In contrast, the presence of juries in
courts of law supported the idea that this type of court embodied American
democracy in ways that equity courts, with their all-powerful chancellor and
their secret proceedings, could never do. Courts of law enabled lawyers to
perform in public before a jury and to perfect their oratory so that they could
engage in effective jury argument and adversarial cross-examination that
would make clear the strength of their case and their cause. Kessler might be
overly optimistic about the power that civic republicanism exerted on lawyers
in the nineteenth century, but it is important for lawyers in the twenty-first
century to know about the roots of their profession’s commitment to working
for the public good.
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